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Abstract
Background: There are positive and negative consequences of the implementation of out of pocket (OOP) payments
as a source of the healthcare financing. On the one hand, OOP burden increases awareness of treatment costs and
limits unnecessary use of healthcare services. On the other hand, it may prevent the sick from accessing needed care.
Consequently there are several aspects that ought to be taken into consideration while defining the optimal structure
of OOP payments. The objective of this study was twofold. Firstly, it was to understand what actions are taken to
decrease the OOP burden. Secondly, it was to address the question whether the implementation of any form of formal
OOP payments may impact negatively upon fairness in financial contribution.
Methods: The literature search was conducted using the Pubmed, Embase, Cochrane Library and Center of Review
and Dissemination databases. Only studies which measured the Kakwani index of progressivity in at least two time
points were included. Articles written in English published between January 2004 and September 2015 were searched.
No geographical restriction was imposed. An increment of more than 0.10 in the Kakwani index was considered as a
significant health policy impact.
Results: In total 16 publications were included, of which nine studied attempts to decrease the OOP burden, four
described the consequences of the introduction of formal fees, and three covered both topics. Overall, a significant
health policy impact was noted in four cases. All of them related to a reduction in the OOP burden, with three and
one noting a change towards the progressivity and regressivity of direct healthcare payments respectively. Among
jurisdictions which introduced formal fees, none study noted a significant impact on the regressivity of OOP spendings.
Conclusions: In the majority of cases, a health policy impact on the distribution of OOP health payments was
insignificant. The reduction of OOP burden cannot be achieved successfully without adequate extension of healthcare
coverage or engagement of other sources of healthcare financing. When formal fees are being introduced, protection
against catastrophic healthcare payments is needed for the most vulnerable groups.
Keywords: Kakwani index, Progressivity, Out of pocket payments, Equity
Background
According to the World Health Organization there are
three main goals for a healthcare system: good health, re-
sponsiveness to the expectations of the population, and
fairness of financial contribution [1]. While the first ob-
jective, overall improvement of health, is self -explanatory
the other two require more clarification. Responsiveness
addresses the question of how far the healthcare system
responds to people’s expectations of it. The concept of
fairness can be defined as “the highest possible degree of
separation between contribution and utilization”. It de-
mands financial responsibility to vary according to ability
to pay, and access to the healthcare system to vary accord-
ing to healthcare needs irrespective of ability to pay [1].
According to the World Health Organization (WHO),
all three of a healthcare system’s ultimate goals should
be considered equally valid. Improvement of health
alone in society is not sufficient. In order to ensure a
health system’s responsiveness and financial protection,
the consequences of the actions of health policy, espe-
cially with respect to the worst off, have to be
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thoroughly studied. Even a small absolute risk can be
devastating to the health and financial situation of the
poorest. Therefore unless the decision makers take into
consideration the impact of their health policies on the
least disadvantaged groups, all three healthcare system
objectives cannot be successfully met. In an era of global
crisis and decline in healthcare spending, the financial
implications of healthcare policies upon the worst off
carry an even stronger meaning [2].
Although the concept of financial protection refers to
all sources of healthcare financing, out of pocket (OOP)
health payments are of special importance. According to
some experts, distribution of the OOP’s burden across
society should be considered “a strong test” of the fair-
ness of the healthcare system [3].
When the public share of healthcare financing be-
comes insufficient, private healthcare expenditures have
to compensate for it. If the balance between public and
private funds is distorted, the health system objective of
financial protection is undermined [4].
The available Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) data indicates that OOP
spending constitutes roughly 20 % of total health expend-
iture [5]. The role of direct household healthcare pay-
ments goes beyond fiscal consideration. There are positive
and negative consequences of cost sharing in the health-
care sector. On the one hand, direct participation of
patients in healthcare financing increases awareness of
treatment costs and limits unnecessary use of healthcare
services. On the other hand, it may prevent the sick and
disadvantaged from accessing the care needed [6]. Conse-
quently, OOP health payments ought to be affordable for
the worst off. Otherwise differences in access to medical
services across society will become apparent and health-
care systems will fail to respond equally to everyone’s
needs.
The objective of this paper was to conduct a systematic
literature review and investigate how different jurisdic-
tions strive to achieve fairness in financial contribution
with respect to OOP health payments. In particular it was
to address two questions: What actions do health policy
makers take to decrease the burden of OOP spending?
Does the implementation of any form of formal user fees
impact negatively upon fairness in financial contribution?
To allow comparisons between different time points as
well as across jurisdictions, studies which calculated the
Kakwani index were selected [7]. The Kakwani Index is
the most widely used measure of fairness in financial
contributions in the healthcare sector. It addresses the
question of how the distribution of OOP health pay-
ments departs from proportionality. Equity according to
need requires that everyone is entitled to access the
healthcare system irrespective of the size of their finan-
cial resources. It can only be achieved if healthcare
contributions are collected according to the principle of
ability to pay. Hence the underlying hypothesis for this
study was that for the healthcare system to pursue the
objective of fairness in financial contributions it needs to
ensure the financial burden is distributed progressively
or at least proportionally.
Methods
The literature search was conducted using the Pubmed,
Embase, Cochrane Library and Center of Review and
Dissemination databases. The following key words were
used: out-of-pocket payments, health expenditures, cost
sharing, deductibles, coinsurance and copayments. Each
of them was paired with two search words: Kakwani
Index and progressivity. In order to address the research
questions, studies which measured the Kakwani index of
progressivity in at least two time points were included.
All articles written in English and published between
January 2004 and September 2015 were searched. No
geographical restrictions were imposed. Publications
limited to the methodological considerations and disease
specific studies were excluded.
The systematic review was conducted and reported
according to the Preferred Reporting Items for System-
atic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) checklist [8].
Selection and review of papers was conducted independ-
ently by two reviewers, and disagreements were resolved
by consensus.
The following subgroups were constituted for the pur-
pose of the analysis: studies of health policy actions to
decrease the burden of OOPs, studies of the conse-
quences of the introduction of a formal system of OOPs,
and those which covered both topics. A review of legal
changes (health policy impact) during the period studied
was conducted to classify each publication into one of
the above groups.
The Kakwani index measures the degree to which the
distribution of out of pocket payments departs from pro-
portionality. It is calculated as the difference between the
Concentration index (C) and the Gini coefficient (G) [7].
k ¼ C–G
While the first measures the degree of income-related
inequality of a given health variable (in our case OOP
payments), the second assesses income inequality. The
Kakwani index can take values from minus two to one.
Because the concentration index takes a value from
minus one to one (when all OOP payments are borne by
the poorest and riches person respectively. Whereas the
Gini coefficient varies from zero (perfect income equal-
ity) to one (perfect income inequality). A positive value
of the Kakwani index indicates progressivity. A negative
value, on the other hand, means regressivity. If the index
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equals minus two, the concentration of pre-payment in-
come occurs at the very top of the distribution and the
poorest person bears all of the OOP spending. When the
Kakwani index equals one, the pre-payment income is
distributed equally and all of the OOP payments are
borne by the richest person. If, by contrast, direct
healthcare expenditures are a proportional source of
healthcare financing, the Kakwani index will be zero.
In a graphical way, the Kakwani index can be defined
as twice the area between a Lorenz curve and a concen-
tration curve. The Lorenz curve represents income dis-
tribution. It plots the cumulative proportion of income
against the cumulative proportion of the population
ranked according to the income. The more unequal the
distribution the further the Lorenz curve lies below the
diagonal (the line of perfect equity). The concentration
curve represents health variable distribution (such as
OOP burden). It plots the cumulative percentage of
OOP payments against the cumulative percentage of the
population, ranked by income. If OOP expenses are dis-
proportionally distributed amongst poorer (richer) people,
the concentration curve will lie above (below) the line of
equality. If OOP payments are a progressive (regressive)
source of financing, the concentration curve will lie below
(above) the Lorenz curve, and the Kakwani index will be
positive (negative).
The significance of the change was measured following
the approach introduced by Yu et al. (2008). They assumed
that an increment in the index of more than 0.10 was
considered as significant [9].
Studies of equity in healthcare financing allow for
different measurements of ability to pay to be used. Dis-
posable household income or household expenditures
are used interchangeably. There are pros and cons for
both measurements. Given the potential impact of the
choice of ability to pay measurement on results, it was
reported separately for each study.
Results
In total 77 publications which fulfilled the criteria, based
on screening of the title, were identified in the databases.
As many as 70 were excluded during the abstract review
process out of which 37 were repetitions, 17 only re-
ported the Kakwani index for 1 year of observation, five
were limited to methodological considerations and seven
did not report the Kakwani index at all. Additionally,
there were three with limited scope of analysis to a spe-
cific group of patients and one was excluded due to
non-English language. The remaining seven were se-
lected for the review. A subsequent search of references
and grey literature revealed an additional nine studies.
In total, 16 publications were included. Figure 1 shows
the flow diagram of selection of publications.
Table 1 provides the basic characteristics of all
reviewed studies. While eight publications reported in-
come, only seven studies used expenditure as a welfare
measurement. In one case, both approaches were tested.
Except for the article written by Hanley et al. regarding
British Columbia in Canada, all studies utilized house-
hold surveys for the purpose of the analysis. In contrast
to the others, the Canadian study was based on a pre-
scriptions’ database. The size of study population varied
from 1600 households in Slovakia to 1,700,000 house-
holds in British Columbia in Canada [10, 11].
Following the approach outlined in the methodology,
studies were categorized into three groups. The first
Included full texts: 16
Excluded: 70
Repetitions: 37
Kakwani index reported only for
one year: 17
Methodological considerations: 5
No Kakwani index reported: 7
Limited scope of the analysis to a





Center of Review and
Dissemination: 0
Analysed full texts: 77
Grey literature: 9
Fig. 1 The systematic review flow
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one consisted of publications which analyzed health
policies’ attempts to decrease the OOP burden. Out of
nine studies included in this group, seven focused on
the impact of the introduction of universal healthcare
coverage, one analyzed the implementation of voluntary
healthcare insurance and the last one evaluated the
consequences of changes in drug policies (Table 2). The
second group consisted of four studies which described
the impact of the introduction of OOP health payment
regulations on fairness in financial contribution. They
covered health policies embracing formal fees for both
ambulatory care visits and hospital stays, as well as
Table 1 List of studies included in the systematic review
Author Jurisdiction Year of
publication
Data source No of households (year) Reference
1 Markova N. Bulgaria 2006 Living Standards Measurement
Surveys (LSMS) of the World
Bank for 1995 and 2001
2400 (Y 1995–2001) [23]
2 Hanley G. E.et al. Canada/British
Columbia
2008 BC PharmaNet, prescription drug
utilization data for residents
registered for BC Medical Services
Plan for at least 275 days during
each year from 2000 to 2004)
1,700,000 (Y 2000–2004) [10]
3 Chen M., Zhao Y., Si L. China 2014 Household Surveys, Heilongjiang
province, Northeast China
3841 (Y 2003); 5530 (Y 2008) [17]
4 Chen M. Chen W. Zhao Y. China 2012 Household Surveys, Gansu province,
China.
3946 (Y 2003); 3958 (Y 2008) [18]
5 Castano R. et al. Columbia 2002 Nation-wide cross sectional surveys,
the National Department of
Statistics (DANE).
26,117 (Y 1984); 28,022 (Y 1994);
9121 (Y 1997).
[14]
6 Krutilova V. Czech Rep 2013 Household Budget Survey (HBS),
Survey on Income and Living
Conditions (SILC) and European
Health Interview Survey (EHIS)
2765 (Y 2007); 2685 (Y 2008);
2686 (Y 2009)
[22]
7 Võrk A., Saluse J., Habicht J. Estonia 2009 Estonian Household Budget Surveys 6256 (Y 2000); 6053 (Y 2001);
5721 (Y 2002); 3391 (Y 2003);
3233 (Y 2004); 3601 (Y 2005);
3807 (Y 2006); 3406 (Y 2007)
[20]
8 Dukhan Y et al. France 2010 French household budget surveys
from 1995, 2001 and 2006
10,240 (2006); 10,305 (2001);
9634 (1995)
[25]
9 Baji P. et al. Hungary 2012 Household Budget Survey, the
Central Statistical Office
9058 (Y 2005); 8975 (Y 2006);
8547 (Y 2007); 7650 (Y 2008)
[21]
10 Zare H. et al. Iran 2014 Iran’s Households Income and
Expenditure Survey (HIES), the
Statistical Center of Iran (SCI)
342,532 rural; 308,735 urban
(Y 1984 - Y 2010)
[19]
11 Smith S. Ireland 2010 Household Budget Survey (HBS)
data for 1987/88,13 1999/2000
and 2004/05.
7705 (Y 1987/88); 7644
(Y 1999/2000); 6884 (Y 2004/05)
[24]
12 Kiss S. Slovakia 2007 Household Budged Survey, the
Statistical Office for 2001–2005
of the Slovak Republic
1600 (Y 2001–2005) [11]
13 Limwattananon S. et al. Thailand 2011 Health and Welfare Surveys (HWS)
household surveys conducted by
the National Statistical Office in
2001, 2003, 2006 and 2007
70,000 individuals (Y 2001 - Y 2007) [12]
14 Ali SI Vietnam 2009 Cross-sectional household survey
data collected from three provinces:
Hai Phong, NinhBinh and Dong Thap
1650 adults; 1101 children
(Y 1999)
[13]
15 ÖzlemGöçmez Turkey 2010 “Household Budget Survey” from
Turkish Statistical Institute for




16 Yardim M.S. Cilingiroglu N.
Yardim N.
Turkey 2014 “Household Budget Survey” from
Turkish Statistical Institute for years
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Table 2 The description of health policies aiming at OOP burden reduction
Jurisdiction Health policy objective in the
studied period
Cost sharing mechanism Reference
Outpatient/Inpatient services Pharmaceuticals




NA Shift from age-based to income-
based eligibility drug reimbursement
system: 1. before 2002; 100 % drug
coverage for social assistance
recipients, 100 % coverage with
pharmacists’ dispensing fees for
seniors and fixed-deductible
coverage for ‘catastrophic’ drug
expenses for others 2. In 2002;
prescription fees for seniors with
cap on spending, others remained
unchanged 3. from 2003; three
age-income groups, co-insurance
varies from 0 to 30 %, family
deductibles- from 0 to 3 % of
household gross income, max
OOPs- from 0 to 4 % of
household gross income
[10]
2 China Decrease the OOP burden
after the introduction of
insurance based healthcare
system.
There are two types of healthcare
insurance for city dwellers. Urban
Resident’s Basic Medical Insurance
(UWBMI) for employees and Urban
Resident’s Basic Medical Insurance
(URBMI) for the unemployed, children,
students, and elderly persons without
pensions were introduced. In the
UWBMI, employees and employers
contribute 2 % and 6–8 % of salaries
respectively. The URBMI is funded by
individuals with appropriate subsidies
granted by government. In 2003 New
Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme
(NCMS) for rural workers were
established (92 % coverage in 2007).
NA [17, 18]
3 Columbia Decrease the OOP burden
after the introduction of
insurance based healthcare
system.
In 1993 National Social Health
Insurance System (NSHIS) was
established: 1. Employed and self-
employed were financed solidarly
by employees and employers (in
total 12 % of salary). It covered all
first-degree family members of
those who contribute and pensioners.
2. Poor were financed by taxes and
solidarity contribution from other
insurance funds. The poor was defined
by set of criteria such as labor market
participation, income, educational
attainment, family structure, access
to water and sanitation and others.
Interventions are grouped by categories
of medical care and levels of complexity.
NA [14, 32]
4 Iran Decrease the OOP burden
after the introduction of
insurance based healthcare
system.
Healthcare reform steps: 1. development
of primary health care (PHC) networks
and medical facilities (1990–94), 2. the
introduction of health insurance (1994–99),
3. Further development and improvement
of healthcare coverage (2000–04), 4.
decreasing inequalities in health
expenditures (2005–09)
NA [19]
5 Thailand The extension of universal
healthcare coverage
Since October 2001, Universal health
insurance system: the curative package
(ambulatory and hospitalization service),
the high-cost care package, and the
promotive and preventive package. The B
30 copayment was introduced in 2001
In 2003 a universal access to
antiretroviral drugs was established.
[12]
Kolasa and Kowalczyk BMC Public Health  (2016) 16:992 Page 5 of 14
copayments for drugs (Table 3). Finally the third group
gathered the remaining three studies which covered
both the implementation of public and private health-
care insurance as well as the introduction of formal fees
for healthcare visits (Table 4).
Out of the nine publications included in the first
group, three reported significant improvement in pro-
gressively of OOP payment distribution measured by the
Kakwani index during the study period (Table 5). This
was the case for British Columbia in Canada, Thailand
and Vietnam [10, 12, 13]. The first one differed from the
others by the fact that OOP spending was the most re-
gressive source of healthcare financing at baseline i.e.
before the reform took place. Although only limited to
the drug policy, it was the largest and most significant
reduction of regressivity across all of the studies
reviewed. In Thailand, the introduction of a universal
health insurance system lead to significant improvement
of the Kakwani index [12]. Conditional on the methodo-
logical approach taken, the Vietnamese study indicated
Table 2 The description of health policies aiming at OOP burden reduction (Continued)
(equivalent to US$ 1 in 2010) per
ambulatory visit or hospital admission. It
was abolished in 2006. The total number of
insured rose from 33 % in 1991 to 71 % in
2001 and 98 % in 2007. In 2007, the
universal coverage was the biggest insurer
(75 % of total population), Social Security
Scheme for private employees (13 %), Civil
servants for public employees (8 %) private
health insurance (2 %).
6 Turkey Extension of free of charge
healthcare for low income
inhabitants (green card holders)
In 1992 a Green card system was established
for income below one-third of the base
wage rate (ca 18 % of population in 2007). It
allowed a free access to inpatient care. In
2004 it was extended to cover alllevels of
healthcare except for 20 % co-payment for
pharmaceuticals. One year later, Green Card
holders were given access to outpatient care
and pharmaceuticals. In 2008, they have
formally joined Universal Health Insurance.
By 2011, about 85 % of the poorest decile
was covered by the Green Card or another
insurance scheme.
Non-Green card holders pay 8 TL (€3.6)
and 15 TL (€6.8) for outpatient services in
public and private hospitals, respectively
unless they have referral from a GP.
Primary care services are free of charge.
After 2003, additional copays may apply if
the cost of care in a private hospital is
higher than public reimbursement.
Informal payments are estimated at 5.2 %
of total OOP expenditure.
20 % of prescription charges for
all active workers including Green
Card holders; retirees pay 10 %.
Since 2004, 333 jumbo referencing
groups established. A reimbursement
for any product set at the level of the
cheapest in the group plus 15 %.
Patient pays the difference between
reimbursement and the actual
price of the drug.
[15, 16, 38, 39]
7 Vietnam The role of Voluntary Health
Insurance in broadening the
access to healthcare system
Since 1991, healthcare services were
covered mainly through OOPs. After
healthcare reform in 1992, three groups of
beneficiers were established: 1.eligible for
Compulsory Health Insurance (public
sector, workers of private companies
companies with over ten employees) 2.
eligible for Voluntary Health Insurance
(employed not included in 1, self-
employed, dependend of those in group 1,
school children and other students) 3. Not
eligible for Compulsory Health Insurance
and too poor for VHI. Out of 76 mln of
Vietnamese in the group 2, 3.6 mln had
VHI and 33.4 mln still paid fully OOPs. Since
1998, insured patients are obliged to make
a copayment of 20 % of the total costs of
care provided. An annual ceiling of half the
minimum annual salary was introduced
as well.
NA [13]
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that voluntary healthcare insurance (VHI) significantly
improved the progressivity of OOP payments compared
to non-VHI healthcare users as well [13].
Apart from one, the remaining publications in the first
group did not report any significant decrease of OOP
burden. Among them were studies regarding Columbia,
Turkey, China and Iran [14–19]. While the Kakwani index
improved slightly for Columbia, the opposite was found
for Turkey. Despite minor differences in the methodo-
logical approach towards the calculation of the income
Table 3 The description of consequences of OOP healthcare payments’ introduction
Jurisdiction Health policy change in
studied period
Cost sharing mechanism References
Outpatient/Inpatient services Pharmaceuticals
1 Czech Rep Introduction of formal fees Until the end of 2007, outpatient and
inpatient services were free of charge.
Since 2008, formal OOPs exists; a flat fee of
30 CZK (€1.2) per doctor visit, 60 CZK (€2.4)
per hospital day as well as spa hotels, 90
CZK (€3.6) per ambulatory visit outside of
working hours. An annual ceiling of CZK
5000 (€200) for expenses related to doctor
visits and drug costs was introduced. Since
2009, a new ceiling of CZK 2500 (€100) for
those below 18 and above 65 was
launched. A flat fee per doctor visit for
children was eliminated. Since 2012, a flat
fee for hospital and spa stay was reduced
to 100 CZK per stay (€3.92 EUR). The dental
care is paid by OOPs too. Some groups
such as poor, pregnant woman, chronically
ill children, patients with infectious
diseases are exempted from formal OOPs.
(Exchange rate used; 1 EUR = 250 CZK)
Until 2008, some form of co-payments
existed. A prescription fee of 30 CZK (1.18
EUR) per item was introduced in 2008.
Since 2009, a difference between actual
and reimbursement price is paid out of
pocket if it is higher than prescription fee.
[3, 22]
2 Estonia Introduction of formal fees Since 1995, a fee of €0.30 (EEK 5) per first
initial outpatient consultation at public
hospitals and/or health centers exists, a
free price setting for specialists. Since 2002,
no fees for GP visits (except for home GP
visit which is €3.2) but ambulatory
specialist care at maximum fee of €3.20
(EEK 50) unless a referral within the same
institution or specialty is granted. Hospital
fees are implemented at 1.6 EUR per day,
for up to 10 days per episode of illness.
Some exemptions for children, pregnant
woman and emergency care apply.
(Exchange rate used; 1 EUR = 15.6 EEK)
Co-payment consist of a prescription fee of
€1.30 plus the difference between actual
price and reimbursement level. The general
reimbursement rate is 50 % of the
pharmaceutical price up to a maximum
reimbursement of €12.00 (EEK 200) per
prescription. The reimbursement of drugs
for chronic disease, children, seniors and
disabled is higher, up to 100 % .
[40, 41]
3 Hungary Introduction of formal fees To limited extend, some form of
copayments already existed since 1989
(medical devices, spas, specialist treatment
outside of standard patient’s pathway etc.).
Since 2007 formal co-payments were
introduced; app €1 per ambulatory visit
and per hospital day. After the referendum
held in 2008, they were abolished.
Since 2007 reimbursement rates have been
decreased from 50 to 25 %; from 70 to
55 %; and from 90 to 85 %. For drugs with
a special reimbursement of 90 %, three
levels of coverage was established: 50, 70
and 90 %. For drugs fully reimbursed, a
minimum €1 (300 HUF) fee per
prescription was introduced. For special
attentionpatients eligible for free of charge
drugs, a monthly limit of 40 EUR was
established. OOPs apply above that sum.
Eligibility for special attention is defined by
GP. (Exchange rate used; 1 EUR = 250 HUF)
[21, 34]
4 Slovakia Introduction of formal fees The formal copayments were introduced in
2003. Since then, app. €0.66 is paid per
doctor visit and app. 1.66 EUR per hospital
day, app €1.99 per emergency care
visit,€0.07 per km for ambulance transport
and between €4.98 and 7.30 per food and
accommodation in spas. In 2006, user fees
for a doctor’s visit and daily hospital stay
were abolished. (Exchange rate used; 1
EUR = 40.03 SKK)
Until 2003, some form of co-payments
existed. Since then €0.5 EUR prescription
fee has to be paid. It was reduced to
€0.17in 2006. If there is a difference
between the price of the drug and the
reimbursement level, patient has to cover
it as well.
[11, 42]
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Table 4 The description of health policies aiming both OOP healthcare payments’ introduction and at OOP burden reduction
Jurisdiction Health policy change in
studied period
Cost sharing mechanism References
Outpatient/Inpatient services Pharmaceuticals
1 Bulgaria 1. Introduction of universal
healthcare insurance system
2. Implementation of formal fees
The healthcare insurance act of 1998
converted the Bulgarian health system
into a health insurance system. Since
2000 formal co-payments at 1 % of the
minimum wage for GP and outpatient
visit, 2 % of the minimum wage for the
first 10 days of the hospital stay (no fee
for a subsequent hospitalization during
the year), emergency care without co-pays,
full price for specialist care and other
services outside the standard patient
pathway. User fees apply to all patients with
some exceptions: children, pregnant women,
unemployed individuals, those with income
below a certain threshold, chronically sick
patients and some other groups.
There is a Positive Drug List which
shortlist full coverage for outpatient,
inpatient settings as well as treatment
for oncological, rare, infectious diseases
as well as AIDS. Drugs outside Positive
List have to be fully paid out of pocket.
[29]
2 France 1. Introduction of public
complementary health
insurance coverage for certain
groups introduced
2. Implementation of formal
fees
In general, healthcare insurance coverage
varies from 100 % for hospital care to 70 %
for ambulatory care and 60 % for medical
auxiliaries as well as for laboratory tests.
Full coverage exists for long-term illnesses,
pregnant woman (after 5th month) and
others. A system of copayments; since
2004, an extra co-payment for direct access
to specialists or other GPs without
remission (40 % of the standard SHI tariff).
a flat-rate catering fee of €18 per day for
accommodation in hospital. Since 2005, €1
on every physician visit, biological test and
radiograph up to a ceiling of €4 per day
and €50 per year has been introduced.
Since 2006, patients have had to pay a flat
rate of €18 for care with a statutory tariff
over €91. VHI covers cost sharing without
flat fees (other exemptions apply as well).
The VHI population’s coverage increased
from 50 % in 1970 to 88 % in 2006. A free
public complementary health insurance
(CMU) and a voucher scheme (ACS) for
those who cannot afford VHI were
established in 2000 and 2004 respectively.
Reimbursement rates varies from
15, 35, 65 or 100 %. On the average
rate of reimbursement for drugs is
estimated to be 73 %. There is a fee
of €0.5 is charged for every drug
package up to a ceiling of €50 per year .
[30]
3 Ireland 1. The expansion of GP Visit
Card accessibility
2. A decline of 95,000 in the
number of Medical Card
holders (1997–2005)
For medical card holders (eligibility is set
based on income and age) there is a free
of charge GP, hospital and dental care,
drugs, medical appliances and others.
Non-medical card holders pay out of
pocket for GP visits (from €50 to €90),
consultants’ fees, €66 for hospital stay
per day up to €660 per year. Based on
a referral for inpatient and outpatient
services, no charges are levied for diagnostic
tests. Private health insurance covers fully
OOPs for inpatient care and outpatient
services to some extent. The costs of dental
and optical care is reduced for Treatment
Benefit Scheme holders (operated by the
Department of Social and Family Affairs for
those who pays Pay-related social insurance).
The number of medical cardholders
decreased from 37 % in 80-ties to 30 % in
2007. Since 2005, for those with income up
to 50 % (change from 25 %) higher than the
ceiling for a Medical Card, a free of charge
GP visits’ system (GP Visit Card) was
introduced. The evolution of private health
insurance from 4 %- 1960 to 35 % -1987
For medical card holders - free
of charge, for others - up to
€90 per month. For chronic
long-Term Illness Scheme, open
to individuals with one of a
number of predefined chronic
conditions - covers the costs of
all necessary pharmaceuticals,
medicines and appliances Others
bears full cost of the drug but
they should apply for a Drugs
Payment Scheme (DPS) which
limits out-of-pocket expenditure
for an individual or family to no
more than certain ceiling (for
example in 2014; €144) per calendar
month for prescribed pharmaceuticals,
medicines and appliances. DPS
replaced Drugs Refund Scheme in
July 1999. DRS operated on similar
principles as DPS.
[24, 35, 36]
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Table 5 Kakwani index of progressivity in selected publications
Group Kakwani index Ability to pay Reference








1 Canada 1 2001 (non seniors) −0.373 −0.100 x [10]
2001 (seniors) −0.299 NA
2004 (non seniors) −0.253
2004 (seniors) −0.078
2004 −0.195 −0.099 −0.087
2,3 China Heilongjiang
province






2002 (urban) 0.0455 0.0854 0.0431 x [18]
2002 (rural) 0.0448 0.0810 0.0148
2007 (urban) 0.0488 0.0089 0.0351
2007 (rural) 0.0086 0.2534 −0.0226
4 Columbia 1984 −0.009 NA x x [14]
1997 0.003




6 Thailand 2000 −0.150 −0.362 −0.004 x [12]
2002 −0.076 −0.391 0.001
2004 −0.076 −0.323 0.034
2006 −0.045 0.041
7,8 Turkey 2003 −0.147 NA x [15]
2006 −0.152
2003 0.079 x [16]
2006 0.009
2009 −0.028
9 Vietnam Insured (1999) from (−0.244)
to (−0.065)
NA x [13]
Uninsured (1999) from (−0.242)
to (−0.173)
10 Czech Republic 2 2007 −0.084 NA x [22]
2008 −0.125
2009 −0.114
11 Estonia 2000 −0.300 NA 0.032 x [20]
2007 −0.379 0.005




13 Slovakia 2001 −0.170 NA 0.020 x [11]
2005 −0.210 −0.010
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variable both studies provided similar trends for changes
in the Kakwani index in Turkey. Not only did the trends
for both China and Iran indicate change towards less pro-
gressive OOP payment distribution but they lay outside
the range for others. Apart from a significant change in
the regressivity of the Kakwani index for the Chinese
urban cohort, all other results were found insignificant.
As far as the second group is concerned, none of the
studies reached significance in the change to the Kak-
wani index (Table 2). Among the publications included,
Central Eastern European settings prevailed [20–22].
The implementation of formal user fees made OOP
health payments most burdensome in Estonia [20]. A
similar health policy change cannot be neglected with
respect to the Slovak households either [11]. Compari-
son of the Kakwani index revealed that Hungarian OOP
payments were the second most regressive source of
healthcare financing across the jurisdictions studied [21].
In the Czech Republic the introduction of formal user
fees affected the poorest to the greatest extent in the
first year, the situation however improved in the subse-
quent year. It must be mentioned however that Czech
co-payments for General Practitioners (GPs) were com-
parable to those in Estonia. In the majority of cases
across the jurisdictions studied, specialists’ fees varied
depending upon referral from GPs. Among the protec-
tion mechanisms for the most vulnerable, the exemption
mechanism prevailed. A ceiling on copayments was in-
troduced in the Czech Republic and Estonia as well as
Hungary [20–22].
In similar fashion to the second group, none of the
studies in the last group produced significant results re-
garding changes in the Kakwani index in the period
studied. Among the publications included in the third
group, there were studies of Bulgarian, Irish and French
reforms [23–25]. The results were mixed. In the first
case, the introduction of healthcare insurance alongside
formal fees for healthcare visits worsened the OOP bur-
den. The trend towards regressivity of OOP spending
continued throughout the observation period in Ireland
as well [24]. It has to be underlined that the Irish data
allowed for the longest follow up. In France, by contrast,
the Kakwani index stayed almost unchanged [25].
Although OOP payments remained a positive source of
healthcare financing throughout the observation period
there, the Kakwani index for VHI remained negative
which balanced the progressivity of OOP payments to
some extent.
As far as the choice of proxy for the ability to pay is
concerned, both household disposable income and
household expenditure were utilized so that half of the
studies used the first and the other half the second
measurement. No clear pattern of impact related to
choice on the results could be distinguished.
Discussion
Among the 16 studies included, a significant health pol-
icy impact was only achieved in four cases, and all of
these related to the reduction of the OOP burden.
Among them were three studies which revealed a change
towards progressivity. The remaining one was reported
for China and surprisingly indicated a trend towards re-
gressivity of OOP payments. As the Kakwani index for
the Chinese study lay outside the range of the others, its
results have to be treated with caution.
None of the studies related to the introduction of for-
mal fees for healthcare visits noted a significant impact
on OOP payment distribution.
The majority of health policy attempts on the reduc-
tion of OOP burden were studied in developing coun-
tries. Interestingly enough, publications regarding the
consequences of the introduction of formal fees for
healthcare visits concerned healthcare reforms con-
ducted in Central Eastern European (CEE) settings.
As far as the first study objective is concerned, the sys-
tematic literature review that was performed provided
two key valuable insights into the effects of health pol-
icies against excessive OOP burden.
First of all, revealed evidence indicated that the reduc-
tion of a household financial healthcare burden could not
be achieved without adequate involvement of indirect
sources of healthcare financing. This was proved with the
examples from both Columbia and Bulgaria [14, 23]. In
the Columbian case, the health care reform was based on
social insurance. Due to a slow uptake in the implementa-
tion of the new scheme, the achievement of equal
Table 5 Kakwani index of progressivity in selected publications (Continued)
14 Bulgaria 3 1995 −0.320 NA −0.258 x [23]
2001 −0.396 −0.316
15 France 2001 0.043 −0.248 NA x [25]
2004 0.046 −0.254
16 Ireland 1987/1988 −0.010 0.080 NA x [24]
1999/2000 −0.100 0.060
2004/2005 −0.108 −0.032
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distribution of OOP payments was very limited [14].
Seven years after the reform’s implementation, as many as
40 % of the eligible poor still did not have healthcare in-
surance coverage [14]. Additionally, the scope of reim-
bursement remained very limited to primary care
services. In similarity with the Columbian example, a
slow uptake of healthcare insurance coverage was noted
in Bulgaria [23]. Public sources still constituted only
57 % of total healthcare financing 7 years after the re-
form took place [26]. Furthermore as many as 25 % of
citizens remained uninsured in 2011 and 19 % in 2013
[27, 28]. It is estimated that up to half of private ex-
penses could be caused by underfunding of the health-
care system from public sources in Bulgaria [29].
Secondly, the reviewed evidence provides some indica-
tion that the negative consequences of the households’
direct engagement in the healthcare financing could be
mitigated with voluntary health insurances (VHI). A not-
able example in this regard is France. The Kakwani
index of OOP payments was positive in both years of
the study. The potential explanation for such a result
could be the popularization of VHI, the key role of
which is to provide reimbursement of user fees. VHI
accounted for 13 % of total expenditure on health and
covered more than 90 % of the population in 2007 [30].
There are, however, risks involved with reliance on VHI
as a key contributor to the healthcare budget. On the
one hand, VHI does ensure progressivity of OOP pay-
ments. On the other, it is a regressive source of health-
care financing on its own. According to the available
studies, socio-demographic differences favoring the well-
off among the consumers of VHI prevail in France. In
addition to the steady growth of the insurance premium,
the scope of VHI’s coverage has only broadened to a
limited extent. According to the available data, VHI
turnover increased by 48 % while benefits only broad-
ened by 32 % in the same period of time [30]. Having ac-
knowledged the access issue, the French government
launched numerous solutions for poor groups of society,
including public complementary health insurance (CMU)
and a voucher scheme (ACS) for those who cannot afford
VHI (Table 4). It remains to be seen whether these solu-
tions are effective enough to improve equity in access to
the healthcare sector.
The Irish example could provide additional insight
into how to overcome economic barriers for poor house-
holds when discussing the importance of VHI for the re-
duction of the OOP burden [31]. According to legal
regulations, Irish insurers must not vary coverage or pre-
mium by age or gender, nor current or prospective state
of health or any other risk factor. There are additional
principles such as open enrollment, lifetime cover and
regulated premiums which minimize access barriers for
the least disadvantaged. Obviously, it is not possible to
conclude whether these particular features of the Irish
system made the Kakwani index of VHI progressive or
almost proportional in the period studied. The so called
community rating system certainly has pros and cons.
On the one hand, it ensures that unhealthy poor individ-
uals are not faced with catastrophic OOPs. On the other,
it does not prevent the healthy poor from subsidizing
the health costs of others. The Vietnamese example indi-
cates that the overall balance could be positive [32]. If
the financial contribution is simply lower than the po-
tential costs of healthcare otherwise purchased on the
private market, VHI can reduce the financial burden on
poor households. The Vietnamese results revealed that
the distribution of OOP payments was more equitable
among those who purchased VHI than the rest of the
population.
As far as the second research objective is concerned,
the conducted literature review addressed the question
as to whether the implementation of any form of OOPs
may impact negatively upon fairness in financial contri-
bution. Oddly enough, it revealed that the introduction
of formal user fees for healthcare visits did not affect the
distribution of OOP health expenses to a significant ex-
tent. Nevertheless, the majority of jurisdictions subse-
quently abolished them anyway. It is however not
surprising, if one takes into account the fact that four
out of five jurisdictions did introduce formal user fees
without any protective mechanism against excessive dir-
ect healthcare expenditures. In Hungary, the system for
privileged groups became even more restrictive prior to
the implementation of formal fees. The right to free of
charge access to drugs was replaced by a monthly per-
sonal budget of up to HUF 12,000 (€45) to cover private
expenses associated with the treatment of chronic dis-
eases, along with HUF 6000 (€24) for acute problems
[33]. Expenses above these limits were to be covered out
of pocket.
The Czech Republic was the only jurisdiction which
actually introduced a ceiling for formal user fees’. Even
there however, there were some challenges with imple-
mentation. Firstly a cap of 200 EUR was established for
expenses related to doctor visits and drug costs. It
turned out however that only 0.2 % of those insured
exceeded this limit in 2008. To adjust further for the real
burden of OOP payments, the cap was limited to 100
EUR for the most vulnerable groups of patients in 2009
[34]. Although it is unclear how the introduction of the
ceiling translated into a reduction in the burden of
OOPs, it has to be admitted that the Kakwani index
measured after the introduction of formal fees was the
lowest in the Czech Republic across all five jurisdictions
included in the systematic review which did introduce
formal user fees. Ceilings on spending on OOPs exist in
both France and Ireland as well. Interestingly enough, in
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each of these jurisdictions the Kakwani index was higher
compared to any of the five countries which launched
formal fees during the observation period.
The importance of exemption from direct healthcare
payments for the least disadvantaged can be illustrated
by the Irish example. In principle, the poorest were enti-
tled to free of charge healthcare. The so called system of
medical cards covered roughly 30 % of the population
[35, 36]. From 2001 until 2009, eligibility was broadened
to those above 70 years of age irrespective of income as
well. Before this happened, due to legal changes a de-
cline in the number of medical card holders (roughly
94,000) was observed. According to some experts, this
decrease was actually responsible for the Kakwani index
being in favor of the better off in 2004/2005 [24].
Although productive in the number of conclusions
drawn, the systematic review conducted was not free
from limitations. There are at least four reasons which
warrant some caution in the ability to generalize the
findings across jurisdictions. Firstly, the scope of the
study did not include any other measures of OOP distri-
bution such as fairness in financial contribution (FFC)
or catastrophic health care expenditures. Secondly, it ex-
cluded publications which presented Kakwani index less
often than at two separate time points. Thirdly, only
English written papers published in the last 10 years
were reviewed. Fourthly, due to the variety of the local
settings across included studies, some caution should be
executed while interpreting the results of the conducted
systematic review. The political, social and economic cir-
cumstances under which a given health policy was im-
plemented, inevitably had some impact on its outcome.
Hence the generalizability of our study findings is lim-
ited to some extent.
Finally, there are various forms of direct patients’ par-
ticipation in healthcare financing such as coinsurance,
copayments or deductibles. Although they differ from
each other in terms of the division of the financial re-
sponsibilities between patient and healthcare service
provider, the scope of this particular systematic review
was limited to the study of the overall distribution of
OOP payments across income groups only. Hence, po-
tential differences in the impact of various forms of
household engagement in the healthcare financing on
the equity in the healthcare financing could not be
distinguished.
Regardless of the above mentioned limitations, the sys-
tematic review that was carried out provides a couple of
key recommendations for both researchers and health
policy makers interested in the analysis of the OOP bur-
den in the healthcare sector.
Turning firstly to future researchers analyzing equity
of healthcare financing, the conducted systematic lit-
erature review underlines how crucial it is to
understand the context in which the Kakwani index is
measured. This can be illustrated with examples from
China and Iran [17–19]. Irrespective of reforms, direct
household spending still remained a key source of
healthcare financing there. The observed progressive
distribution of OOP payments is driven mainly by the
healthcare consumption of the richest, who purchase
healthcare services on the private market. Poor groups
cannot afford it and do not seek medical help. Hence
the positive value of the Kakwani index should be inter-
preted as an issue with access to the healthcare system
rather than equitable distribution favoring the least
disadvantaged.
The Canadian study is another interesting example of
the importance of the context of the analysis of progres-
sivity of OOP payments [10]. In fact, the improvement
of the Kakwani index arose from the decline in public
subsidy for high-income seniors rather than an increased
benefit for low-income non-seniors. Namely, as a conse-
quence of a change from age-based to income-based
subsidies, there was a reduction of public coverage for
high-income seniors. It was estimated that the public
subsidy for senior households with incomes above the
95th percentile was reduced from approximately 65 % to
less than 20 % of their drug expenses [10]. The change
towards a more progressive distribution of OOP spend-
ing was not accompanied, however, by any redistribution
effects to the benefit of low-income households. Hence
the study of the Kakwani index of progressivity alone
does not provide a full picture. In order to understand
the consequences of each policy change, studies on the
utilization patterns of healthcare services have to be
undertaken as well.
Turning secondly to health policy makers evaluating
alternative attempts to reduce the OOP burden, the
conducted systematic literature review indicates that to
achieve progressivity in health financing the share of
regressive sources, particularly out-of-pocket pay-
ments, can be reduced or replaced by adequate funds
from indirect financial sources. The study from
Thailand provides a very inspiring example in this
regard. The introduction of a tax-funded health insur-
ance scheme provided coverage for 75 % of the popula-
tion who were previously not entitled to any other
Benefit Schemes. The increase in financing from direct
taxes (from 18 % in 2000 to 24.5 % in 2006) and social
health insurance (SHI) contribution (from 5.3 % in
2000 to 8.9 % in 2004) lead to the reduction of the
OOP burden (from 33.7 % in 2000 to 23.2 % in 2006)
and an improvement of the Kakwani index from
−0.150 to −0.045 [12].
Taking the health policy makers’ perspective into ac-
count, the performed systematic review indicates clearly
that a universal system based on health tax or SHI
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contribution needs to be implementable first to effect-
ively improve fairness in financial contribution.
The example from Bulgaria illustrates that too slow
an uptake of SHI did not manage to diminish the
OOP burden throughout the observation period. In-
stead of being a tool to navigate the demand towards
more appropriate channels, direct healthcare expendi-
tures still remained a very important source of
healthcare financing. In 2009 formal payments alone
accounted for 35.3 % of total health expenditure in
Bulgaria [37].
As an alternative solution to the increase of healthcare
financing from indirect sources, health policy makers
can turn to the introduction of private healthcare insur-
ance as well. Indeed the evidence available provides
some support for such a solution. However, it should be
underlined that VHI acts against the key principle of
user fees, which is to increase awareness regarding the
real cost of specific treatments. Cost-sharing mecha-
nisms aim to ensure optimal allocation of available
healthcare resources by directing demand towards the
most effective healthcare services designed for specific
health problems as well. Thus, the elevation of patients’
fees might be counterproductive towards allocative effi-
ciency of the healthcare system. Some jurisdictions have
initiated actions to mitigate such risks. The French au-
thorities introduced an additional fee for patients who
choose to divert their treatment path from standard pro-
cedures. Moreover, some financial incentives have been
introduced for insurance companies not to cover certain
patients’ fees within VHI [30]. In similarity with the
French example, the Irish authorities introduced specific
regulations regarding voluntary healthcare insurance
[36]. While hospital fees are mainly covered by private
health insurance, GP fees are only reimbursed by VHI to
a certain extent.
If the health policy objective is to improve fairness in
financial contribution by the elimination of informal
fees, the review of available literature indicates that there
is little chance of improving progressivity after the intro-
duction of formal cost sharing. The Hungarian example
could provide interesting learning in this regard. After
the implementation of formal fees, the regressivity pat-
tern of OOP payments may still remain a challenge in
Hungary. Some reduction of inequity in the distribution
of informal gratuities indeed took place (the Kakwani
index changed from −0.20 to −0.12), however the formal
fees turned out to be a regressive source of healthcare fi-
nancing (the Kakwani index decreased from −0.004 to
−0.096) [20]. Hence to avoid further regressivity of OOP
payments with cost sharing schemes, protection against
the excessive burden of OOPs for the least
disadvantaged groups of society have to be thoroughly
considered.
Conclusions
Although limited to only 16 examples, the literature re-
view that was carried out provides an interesting insight
into real life examples regarding the impact of different
health policies on the distribution of direct healthcare
expenditures. Achieving fairness in financial contribu-
tion with respect to OOP health payments is not an easy
challenge. A healthcare financing system is built on sev-
eral interconnected pillars, and a healthcare reform fo-
cused on one of them will never be successful unless the
impact on others is taken into consideration. There is
still a lot of room for improvement among both the
most and least developed countries. No “one size fits all”
solution has been discovered. Nevertheless, learning
from the successes and failures of others must be
regarded as an important lesson prior to any healthcare
reform implementation.
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